Philacor v. Laguesma

Philacor v. Laguesma

 (By Yul on 28 February 2015)

Facts: 

• The Genuine Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (GLOWHRAIN) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of Philacor. However, this was opposed by the latter, asserting that the questioned employees are managerial employees exercising managerial powers, functions and prerogatives whose decisions were instantly effective and not merely recommendatory, and further asserted, that the alleged issue of whether petitioning employees are managerial employees constituted a prejudicial question, which should be resolved before any further proceedings could continue.
• Eventually, the concerned Med-Arbiter issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of Philacor.
• Philacor filed a Motion to exclude the questioned employees before the Office of the SOLE. Sec. Laguesma affirmed the Mid-Arbiter’s decision.
• Subsequently, Philacor’s Motion for Reconsideration modified SOLE’s decision by finding that the employees occupying the job titles of “Production Supervisor,” “Superintendent Production” and “Production Manager” are managerial employees imbued with managerial prerogatives, and therefore are ineligible to participate in the certification election among the supervisory employees.
• Consequently, the GLOWHRAIN filed a motion for reconsideration, which challenged the authenticity of the job descriptions submitted by Philacor, alleging that the same are irregular having been issued only for the purpose of buttressing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which was granted by Sec. Laguesma. Thus, the filing of Philacor’s Petition.

Issue: Whether the petitioning employees are supervisory employees eligible to form a supervisory union.

Held: Yes. Secretary Laguesma is correct in its findings that the questioned employees are supervisory employees and are eligible to form a supervisory union.

Ratio: The Labor Code was further amended by Republic Act No. 6715. Section 4 of the said Republic Act, amended Article 212 (m), which now contains separate definitions for managerial and supervisory employees, to wit:

“(m) Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. (Underscoring supplied).”

No evidence was presented by Philacor to bolster its claim that petitioning employees exercised the power to shorten employees’ probationary period and the power to change the status of or dismiss a casual employee.

As to the power to discipline, suspend and discharge employees, the SC finds that the petitioning employees merely enforce the company rules and regulations against erring employees. But they are not the one who conducts investigation and imposes penalty.

They do not lay down and execute management policies nor have the power to hire, but merely recommend such management actions.

PHILACOR belatedly presented the job descriptions of the Production Supervisor, Superintendent (Production) and Manager (Production) to show that indeed petitioning employees are exercising managerial powers and prerogatives.

Fallo: The petition is DENIED. The Order dated March 30, 1992 of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment is AFFIRMED.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez et al.

Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez et al.

GR No. 74425

October 7, 1986

Facts: Petitioner corporation has been engaged in the business of newspaper and magazine publishing for over half a century. its current publications include the national daily “Bulletin Today” (now Manila Daily Bulletin), the tabloid “Tempo”, and a weekly magazine called “Panorama”. The total number of the personnel complement of the said firm (exclusive of the editorial staff, contract workers and casuals, etc.), constituting the rank-and-file regular members, is said to be over three hundred persons. The supervisory employees number forty-eight. About three hundred employees belonging to the rank-and-file had previously formed the Bulletin Employees Union. This labor organization (BEU) presently administers their current Collective Bargaining Agreement. Ever since, there has been only one bargaining unit in the petitioner company and this is the BEU – the union of the rank-and-file employees. Supervisory employees were never included in said bargaining unit nor had they ever sought inclusion in the said BEU labor union, much less registered any protest or challenged to their non-inclusion therein.

25 out of 48 supervisors in the Bulletin Publishing Corporation formed a labor union and adopted a charter therefor, calling themselves members of the “Bulletin Publishing Corporation Supervisors Union” or BSU. A petition for registration of BSU, was filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Registration Certificate No. 10547-LC was issued. A letter was sent to the management of petitioner corporation by BSU giving notice of the registration of the BSU and demanding its recognition as the sole bargaining agent of all the supervisors in the company. BSU supervisors union, is, at present, an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) and the Kilusang Mayo Union (KMU). BSU is alleged to be supported in its strike move by the said groups.

A petition for direct certification was filed by the BSU as the bargaining representative of the supervisors. A notice of strike by BSU was filed with the Ministry of Labor due to certain acts allegedly performed by petitioner which BSU claims, in effect, to be union busting and unfair labor practices. Refusing to recognize the BSU, the Bulletin Publishing Corporation filed a petition seeking cancellation of the registration of the BSU on the ground that Article 246 of the Labor Code and Section 11 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules thereof, prohibit supervisors from forming labor organizations.

Following the expiration of the fifteen-day cooling-off period, petitioner was prompted to file a petition with the Ministry of Labor, urging therein that said office assume jurisdiction in the matter of the impending strike. When the Minister of Labor failed to exercise his jurisdiction or act on the matter, petitioner then felt that the remedy it seeks should be sought from this Court because, further resort to the Ministry of Labor may be construed as a tacit recognition by petitioner of the supervisors union (BSU) which would be inconsistent with petitioner’s challenge to the assertion of BSU to exist as a legitimate labor union.

Issue: Whether or not supervisors in petitioner company may, for purposes of collective bargaining, form a union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by the rank-and-file employees of the same company.

Held: The supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a supervisors union, separate and distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is evident that most of the private respondents are considered managerial employees. Also it is distinctly stated in Section 11, Rule I I, of the Ommibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory unions are presently no longer recognized nor allowed to exist and operate as such.

Ratio: Article 246 of the Labor Code explicitly excludes managerial employees from the right of self-organization, the right to form, join and assist labor organizations. A perusal of the job descriptions corresponding to the private respondents as outlined in the petition, clearly reveals the private respondents to be managers, purchasing officers, personnel officers, property officers, supervisors, cashiers, heads of various sections and the like. The nature of their duties gives rise to the irresistible conclusion that most of the herein private respondents are performing managerial functions. Their responsibilities inherently require the exercise’ of discretion and independent judgment as supervisors. They possess the power and authority to lay down or exercise management policies. Managerial employees are those vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank-and file employees (Article 212 (k), Labor Code). We further find very plainly stressed in Section 11, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the same Labor Code, that “All existing supervisory unions and unions of security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the Code, cease to operate as such and their registration certificates shall be deemed automatically cancelled … Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank-and- file labor organization and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank-and-file organizations.” (Emphasis supplied).

It is, therefore, evident that while mention is made of supervisors unions with reference to those existing before the enactment of the Labor Code, greater significance must attach to the fact that under the present Labor Code all these supervisory unions should, after the effectivity of the Labor Code, cease to operate and that the registration certificate of any such supervisors union should even be deemed to be automatically cancelled. It is also clear that such of those supervisory employees who do not assume any managerial function may join or assist an existing rank-and-file union or if none exists, to join or assist in the formation of such rank-and-file organization.

It follows as a logical conclusion that the members of the Bulletin Supervisory Union, wholly composed of supervisors employed by petitioner corporation, are not QUALIFIED to organize a Labor Union of their own. Aside from this reason, is the fact that there is already an existing legitimate labor union, the BEU, which enjoys a current collective bargaining agreement with the petitioner publishing company.

What is pointed out under the law, is that employees who discharge managerial functions, as well as the supervisory employees who do not yet fall within the definition of managerial employees, are prohibited from organizing themselves into a labor union constituted for the purpose of acting as a collective bargaining unit. To sanction the recognition of the Supervisors Union of private respondents, which paradoxically or inadvertently received a registration certificate from the Ministry of Labor, would be for this Court to accept and tolerate a manifest violation of the Labor Code. The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company- dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership.

Acquiescence by private respondents to a classification and situation far different from the rank-and-file employees for a long and unceasing period of time obviously indicates that their exclusion from the rank-and-file union was upon their awareness that their duties place them in a category different from those to which the rank-and-file employees pertain. It is significant that only 25 of the 48 employees who are said to be managers and/or supervisors, belatedly insist in forming a new and separate union.

In sum, where concerted activities are aimed at compelling an employer to ignore the clear mandate of the Labor Code, as in the instant case, grounds based on equity may be invoked from the courts in order to restrain the questioned activities. We cannot remain oblivious to the fact that a strike, as that contemplated by the supervisors union against petitioner can cause irreparable injury to its publications, diminish goodwill and seriously affect its continuity with its regular readers.

Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But when these instruments are utilized by managerial/supervisory employees in violation of existing labor laws, the misuse of these tactics can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the temporary restraining order issued by this Court, dated May 12, 1986, enjoining the private respondents from declaring or staging a strike against the petitioner herein, in all its forms, including walk-out, mass leave, or any kind of activity that will lead to a work stoppage, is hereby made permanent. The public respondents are also directed to act upon and resolve, at the earliest possible time and in the light of the discussion and pronouncements made by the Court in this case, the petition dated April 25, 1986, submitted by the petitioner herein for the cancellation of Bulletin Publishing Corporation Supervisors Union Registration Certificate No. 105-47-LC.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

MARIWASA vs. LEOGARDO

G.R. No. 74246 January 26, 1989

MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC., and ANGEL T. DAZO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Ministry of Labor and Employment judgment, and JOAQUIN A. DEQUILA, respondents.

FACTS:

Joaquin A. Dequila (or Dequilla) was hired on probation by Mariwasa Manufacturing, Inc. as a general utility worker on January 10, 1979. After 6 months, he was informed that his work was unsatisfactory and had failed to meet the required standards. To give him another chance, and with Dequila’s written consent, Mariwasa extended Dequila’s probationary period for another three months: from July 10 to October 9, 1979. Dequila’s performance, however, did not improve and Mariwasa terminated his employment at the end of the extended period.

Dequila filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Mariwasa and its VP for Administration, Angel T. Dazo, and violation of Presidential Decrees Nos. 928 and 1389.

DIRECTOR OF MINISTRY OF LABOR: Complaint is dismissed. Termination is justified. Thus, Dequila appeals to the Minister of Labor.

MINISTER OF LABOR: Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. held that Dequila was already a regular employee at the time of his dismissal, thus, he was illegally dismissed. (Initial order: Reinstatement with full backwages. Later amended to direct payment of Dequila’s backwages from the date of his dismissal to December 20, 1982 only.)

ISSUE: WON employer and employee may, by agreement, extend the probationary period of employment beyond the six months prescribed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code?

RULING:  YES, agreements stipulating longer probationary periods may constitute lawful exceptions to the statutory prescription limiting such periods to six months.

The SC in its decision in Buiser vs. Leogardo, Jr. (1984) said that “Generally, the probationary period of employment is limited to six (6) months. The exception to this general rule is when the parties to an employment contract may agree otherwise, such as when the same is established by company policy or when the same is required by the nature of work to be performed by the employee. In the latter case, there is recognition of the exercise of managerial prerogatives in requiring a longer period of probationary employment, such as in the present case where the probationary period was set for eighteen (18) months, i.e. from May, 1980 to October, 1981 inclusive, especially where the employee must learn a particular kind of work such as selling, or when the job requires certain qualifications, skills experience or training.”

In this case, the extension given to Dequila could not have been pre-arranged to avoid the legal consequences of a probationary period satisfactorily completed.  In fact, it was ex gratia, an act of liberality on the part of his employer affording him a second chance to make good after having initially failed to prove his worth as an employee. Such an act cannot now unjustly be turned against said employer’s account to compel it to keep on its payroll one who could not perform according to its work standards.

By voluntarily agreeing to an extension of the probationary period, Dequila in effect waived any benefit attaching to the completion of said period if he still failed to make the grade during the period of extension. By reasonably extending the period of probation, the questioned agreement actually improved the probationary employee’s prospects of demonstrating his fitness for regular employment.

Petition granted. Order of Deputy Minister Leogardo reversed.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

INNODATA VS QUEJADA-LOPEZ

INNODATA VS QUEJADA-LOPEZ

2006 October 12

By:  Zendy Garcia-Budhi

Facts:   Innodata Philippines, Inc., is engaged in the encoding/data conversion business. It employs encoders, indexers, formatters, programmers, quality/quantity staff, and others, to maintain its business and do the job orders of its clients.

Estrella G. Natividad and Jocelyn L. Quejada were employed as formatters by Innodata Philippines, Inc. They [worked] from March 4, 1997, until their separation on March 3, 1998. They believed that their job was necessary and desirable to the usual business of the company which is data processing/conversion and that their employment is regular pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code,they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for damages as well as for attorney’s fees against Innodata Phils., Incorporated.

Innodata contended that their employment contracts expired, having a fixed period of one (1) year. Since the period expired, their employment was likewise terminated applying the ruling in the Brent School case.

Labor Arbiter Donato G. Quinto rendered a judgment in favor of complainants holding complainants Estella G. Natividad and Jocelyn Quejada to have been illegally dismissed by Innodata Philippines Incorporated and Innodata Processing Corporation and ordering reinstatement to their former position without loss of seniority rights, or to a substantially equivalent position, and to pay them jointly and severally, backwages computed from the time they were illegally dismissed on March 3, 1998 up to the date of this decision in the amount of P112,535.28 EACH, or in the total amount of P225,070.56 for the two of them; and further ordered to pay them attorney’s fees in the amount equivalent to 10% of their respective awards.

Innodata appealed to NLRC which reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s decision declaring that the contract was for a fixed term and therefore, the dismissal at the end of their one year term agreed upon was valid. An MR was filed but was denied.

The CA ruled that respondents were regular employees in accordance with Section 280 of the Labor Code. It said that the fixed-term contract prepared by petitioner was a crude attempt to circumvent respondents’ right to security of tenure.

The disputed contract reads, as follows:

“TERM/DURATION

1. The EMPLOYER hereby employs, engages and hires the EMPLOYEE, and the EMPLOYEE hereby accepts such appointment as FORMATTER effective March 04, 1997 to March 03, 1998, a period of one (1) year.

x x x x x x x x x

“TERMINATION

7.1 This Contract shall automatically terminate on March 03, 1998 without need of notice or demand.

x x x x x x x x x

7.4 The EMPLOYEE acknowledges that the EMPLOYER entered into this Contract upon his express representation that he/she is qualified and possesses the skills necessary and desirable for the position indicated herein. Thus, the EMPLOYER is hereby granted the right to pre-terminate this Contract within the first three (3) months of its duration upon failure of the EMPLOYEE to meet and pass the qualifications and standards set by the EMPLOYER and made known to the EMPLOYEE prior to execution hereof. Failure of the EMPLOYER to exercise its right hereunder shall be without prejudice to the automatic termination of the EMPLOYEE’s employment upon the expiration of this Contract or cancellation thereof for other causes provided herein and by law.”

The contract provided two periods. Aside from the fixed one-year term set in paragraph 1, paragraph 7.4 provides for a three-month period during which petitioner has the right to pre-terminate the employment for the “failure of the employees to meet and pass the qualifications and standards set by the employer and made known to the employee prior to” their employment. In effect, the paragraph 7.4 is a probationary period.

Innodata claims that it was constrained by the nature of its business to enter into fixed-term employment contracts with employees assigned to job orders. It relies on the availability of job orders or undertakings from its clients. Thus, the continuity of work cannot be ascertained.

Hence, this petition.

 

ISSUE: whether the alleged fixed-term employment contracts are valid.

HELD:  No, Innodata’s contract of employment failed to comply with the standards set by law and by this Court. “ A contract of employment is impressed with public interest. For this reason, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract. Hence, the “parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.” Moreover, in case of doubt, the terms of a contract should be construed in favor of labor.”

RATIO: The applicable laws are Article 1700 of the Civil Code  which declares:

“Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.”

And Section 280 of the Labor Code.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

BRENT SCHOOL vs. ZAMORA

BRENT SCHOOL, INC. DIMACHE vs. RONALDO ZAMORA and DOROTEO R. ALEGRE

G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990 en banc

FACTS:

Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e., from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract of July 18, 1971.

On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was “completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment.” Although protesting the announced termination stating that his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his employment lasted for 5 years – therefore he had acquired the status of regular employee – Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor containing the phrase, “in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract.”

The Regional Director considered Brent School’s report as an application for clearance to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of Alegre, as a “permanent employee,” to his former position without loss of seniority rights and with full back wages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized “fixed period employment” or employment for a term.

RULING:

Respondent Alegre’s contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.

The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.

It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.

The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment began to take place at about this time.

Article 320 originally stated that the “termination of employment of probationary employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe.” Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an employer could terminate “an employment without a definite period.” And Article 319 undertook to define “employment without a fixed period” in the following manner: …where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with “a definite period” and “regular” employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December 16, 1975.

Article 320, dealing with “Probationary and fixed period employment,” was altered by eliminating the reference to persons “employed with a fixed period,” and was renumbered (becoming Article 271).

As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer’s using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.

Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of employment as still good rule—a rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher’s) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive period. At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that Reyes’ contract of employment was due to expire and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.

Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre’s employment was terminated upon the
expiration of his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given, not denied.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

BENARES vs. PACHO

JOSEFINA BENARES vs. JAIME PACHO, RODOLFO PANCHO JR,

JOSELITO MEDALLA, ET. AL

FACTS:
On July 24, 1991, complainants thru counsel wrote the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment, Bacolod City for intercession particularly in the matter of wages and other benefits mandated by law.

On September 24, 1991, a routine inspection was conducted by personnel of the Bacolod District Office of the Department of Labor and Employment. Accordingly, a report and recommendation was made, hence, the endorsement by the Regional Director of the instant case to the Regional Arbitration Branch, NLRC, Bacolod City for proper hearing and disposition.

On October 15, 1991, complainants alleged to have been terminated without being paid termination benefits by respondent in retaliation to what they have done in reporting to the Department of Labor and Employment their working conditions viz-a-viz (sic) wages and other mandatory benefits.

On July 14, 1992, notification and summons were served to the parties wherein complainants were directed to file a formal complaint.

On July 28, 1992, a formal complaint was filed for illegal dismissal with money claims.

From the records, summons and notices of hearing were served to the parties and apparently no amicable settlement was arrived, hence, the parties were directed to file their respective position papers.

On January 22, 1993, complainant submitted their position paper, while respondent filed its position paper on June 21, 1993.

On March 17, 1994, complainants filed their reply position paper and affidavit. Correspondingly, a rejoinder was filed by respondent on May 16, 1994.

On August 17, 1994, from the Minutes of the scheduled hearing, respondent failed to appear, and that the Office will evaluate the records of the case whether to conduct a formal trial on the merits or not, and that the corresponding order will be issued.

On January 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter issued an order to the effect that the case is now deemed submitted for resolution.

On April 30, 1998, the Labor Arbiter a quo issued the assailed decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

On June 26, 1998, complainants not satisfied with the aforecited ruling interposed the instant appeal before the NLRC. The NLRC held that respondents attained the status of regular seasonal workers of Hda. Maasin II having worked therein from 1964-1985. It found that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that the termination of respondents was for a just or authorized cause. Hence, respondents were illegally dismissed and should be awarded their money claims.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC’s ruling, with the modification that the backwages and other monetary benefits shall be computed from the time compensation was withheld in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is guilty of  illegal dismissal with money claims.

HELD: YES, the Supreme Court dismissed the instant petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals base on the following premise:

Petitioner underscores the NLRC decision’s mention of the “payroll” she presented despite the fact that she allegedly presented 235 sets of payroll, not just one payroll. This circumstance does not in itself evince any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC as it could well have been just an innocuous typographical error.

Verily, the NLRC’s decision, affirmed as it was by the Court of Appeals, appears to have been arrived at after due consideration of the evidence presented by both parties.

The SC finds no reason to disturb the finding that respondents were illegally terminated. When there is no showing of clear, valid and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a just or authorized cause.25 In this case, as found both by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to prove any such cause for the dismissal of respondents.

PERPETUAL HELP CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. (PHCCI) V.FABURADA

PERPETUAL HELP CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. (PHCCI) V.FABURADA

October 8, 2001

By:  Aurea I. Gruyal

FACTS:

1. Private respondents Faburada et. al. filed a complaint

against   PHCCI for illegal dismissal, premium pay, separation pay, wage differential, moral damages and attorney’s fees.

2. PHCCI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that noemployer-employee relationship exists since privaterespondents are all members and co-owners of thecooperative. Also, private respondents have not exhausted the remedies provided in the coop by laws.

PHCCI also filed a supplemental motion to dismiss

alledging that RA 6939, the Cooperative Development Authority Law, requires conciliation or mediation within the cooperative before a resort to judicial proceeding.

3.The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondents, holding that the case is impressed with employer-employee relationship and that the laws on cooperatives is subservient to the Labor Code. The NLRC affirmed.

 

ISSUE: WON there is an employer-employee relationship between the parties and WON private respondents were regular employees

 HELD: YES.

RATIO:

Elements in determining existence of employer-employee relationship:

1) Selection and engagement of the worker or the power to hire

2) The power to dismiss

3) Payment of wages by whatever means

4) Power to control the worker’s conduct The   above elements are present here. PHCCI through its Manager Mr. Edilberto Lantaca, Jr. hired respondents as

Computer   programmer and clerks. They worked regular working hours, were assigned specific duties, were paid regular wages, and made to accomplish regular time records, and worked under the supervision of the manager.

Art. 280, Labor Code comprehends 3 kinds of employees:

1)REGULAR EMPLOYEES or those whose work is necessary or desirable to the usual business of the employer

2)PROJECT EMPLOYEES or those whoseemployment has been fixed for a specificproject or undertaking the completion ortermination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season

3)CASUAL EMPLOYEES or those who are neither regular nor project employees

There are 2 separate instances whereby it can be determined that an employment is regular:

1)If the particular activity performed by the employee is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer

2)If the employee has been performing the job for at least a year

Private respondents were rendering services necessary to the day-to-day operations of PHCCI. This alone qualified them as regular employees. Moreover, all of them except one worked with PHCCI for more than 1 year.

That Faburada worked only on a part-time basis does not mean that he is not a regular employee .Regularity of employment is not determined by the number of hours one works but by the nature and length of time one has been in that particular job.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

Servidad vs. NLRC

Servidad v. NLRC

1998 March 18, GR No 128682

 

Facts: Servidad was employed on 9 May 1994 by respondent INNODATA as Data Control Clerk, under a contract of employment. Section 2 of such contract states: “This Contract shall be effective for a period of one (1) year commencing on 10 May1994 until 10 May 1995 unless sooner terminated pursuant to the provisions hereof.”

Petitioner was a contractual employee for six months or from the period of May 10, 1994 to November 10, 1994 during which, the employer can terminate with due notice. The contract also states that should the employee continue his employment beyond the 6-month period, he shall become a regular employee upon demonstration of sufficient skill. On November 9, 1995 or one day before his contractual terms ends, he was made to sign a three-month probationary employment and later, an extended three-month employment good until 9 May 1995.Petitioner was terminated on May 9, 1995 and filed an illegal dismissal complaint before the Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter found the respondent INNODATA guilty of the charge and was ordered to pay backwages and reinstatement of petitioner. On appeal thereto by INNODATA, the NLRC reversed the decision declaring that the contract between petitioner and private complainant was for a fixed term and the dismissal, at the end of one year, was valid.

Issue: WON the contract entered into by the petitioner and respondent is valid and enforceable.

Held: NO.

The NLRC found that the contract in question is for a fixed term. The said contract provides for two periods. The first period was for six months terminable at the option of   private respondent, while the second period was also for six months but probationary in character. In both cases, the private respondent did not specify the criteria for the termination or retention of the services of petitioner. It is violative of the right of the employee against unwarranted dismissal. By the provisions of the very contract itself, petitioner has become a regular employee of private respondent.

As to the private respondent statement that the one-year period stipulated in subject contract was to enable petitioner to acquire the skill necessary for the job. In effect, what respondent employer theorized upon is that the one-year term of employment is probationary. If the nature of the job did actually necessitate at least one year for the employee to acquire the requisite training and experience, the same could not be a valid probationary employment as it falls short of the requirement of Article 281[10] of the Labor Code. It was not brought to light that the petitioner was duly informed at the start of his employment, of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a regular employee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the questioned decision of NLRC is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated August 20, 1996, in NLRC-NCR-00-055-03471-95 REINSTATED, with the modification that the award of backwages be computed from the time of the dismissal of petitioner to his actual or payroll reinstatement.  Costs against the private respondent.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS VS PHILIPPINE CONCRETE

LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS VS PHILIPPINE CONCRETE

 

FACTS:  The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented herein plaintiff-appellee’s truck from loading and unloading of its products inside the premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying as a sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.

ISSUE:  May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?

HELD:  Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts are not without power to localize the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus the right may be recognized at the instance of an “innocent bystander” who is not involved in the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is create an impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS WORKERS ASSOCIATION vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANDRES REYES

G.R. No. L-21378           November 28, 1966

REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS WORKERS ASSOCIATION &  PAFLU vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANDRES REYES and AIA FEED MILLS, INC.

 

FACTS:

Respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. filed a petition for injunction before the CFI of Rizal, alleging, among others, that petitioner unions declared a strike against their employer, RFM and picket lines were formed around the premises of the company preventing the peaceful passing of other persons not connected with said employer.

Respondent is a lessee occupying a parcel of land owned by RFM.

It claimed that it is a completely different corporation from RFM with a different set of officers and employees; and there was no employer-employee relation between the striking employees and respondent; and that due to the picket lines formed by the striking unions the employees of herein respondent could not enter and leave its premises “thereby causing the same to stop its operation which constitute an invasion of its property rights and therefore causing irreparable and substantial damages.

Petitioners, Republic Flour Mills Workers Association and PAFLU, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the injunction prayed for by herein respondent is a “labor injunction” and because the petition for injunction failed to allege the jurisdictional requisites provided for in Section 9 (b) of Republic Act 875 it is fatally defective and, therefore, should be dismissed.

The respondent Judge found that AIA Feed Mills, Inc. is a distinct and separate entity from the RFM., that it has a distinct personnel of its own, that it was engaged in a different business, and that petitioner unions’ picketing had no connection whatsoever with herein respondent. Based on said findings, the respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, with preliminary injunction, seeking to set aside the order of the respondent Judge Andres Reyes of the Court of First Instance of in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction “ordering and commanding the defendants to desist from preventing the petitioner’s employees from entering its premises.

Petitioners contend that the respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. is a subsidiary corporation of RFM; that it is located at the very site and compound of the latter, the entrance to, and the walls of, the compound being common to both entities; that the operations of the former and of the latter were intermingled and complementary, including an interchange of employees; thus the picketing of one necessarily is extended to both.

AIA Feed Mills, Inc. alleged that it is a business entity distinct and separate RFM, Inc., that there is no employer-employee relation between it and the striking members of the petitioner labor unions and no labor dispute exist between it and the striking and picketing employees; that the picketing was not a peaceful one because the picketing members of petitioners unions were employing violence against the employees of respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in question, or whether or not it had acted with abuse of discretion in issuing said injunction.

HELD:

No. Respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. is a distinct and separate entity from, the Republic Flour Mills, Inc., with distinct personality of its own from the latter corporation, including the business in which it is engaged, and the picketing by the petitioner unions has no connection whatsoever with respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc.

There is no labor dispute between the petitioners and respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc., and neither is there an employer-employee relation between them.

The Court declared that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent Judge is not a labor injunction that is provided for in Section 9, paragraph (d) of Republic Act 875. The court may issue an injunction, whether temporary or permanent, as provided in said section of Republic Act 875, only in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.

No labor dispute existed between the petitioner unions and the respondent AIA Feed Mills, Inc. The preliminary injunction issued by the respondent Judge was, therefore, one that was within its jurisdiction to issue pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court.)

The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent Judge did not in any way curtail the right of petitioner unions to picket, because the writ simply and clearly ordered and commanded the petitioner unions “to desist from preventing AIA Feed Mills;  employees from entering its premises.

The writ did not prevent petitioner unions from picketing against their employer, the Republic Flour Mills, Inc. The record shows that the respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction after a hearing. The respondent Judge, therefore, had not acted in a manner that was in violation of the law or with grave abuse of discretion when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction in question.

LABREL CASE DIGEST POOL / ATTORNEY JHONELLE ESTRADA / MONDAYS / 5:30 PM TO 8:30 PM / NEW ERA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW